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Restaurant Service for the '90s
by
Sandy K. Strick
and
Rhonda J. Montgomery
and
Charlotte Gant

Much has been written about servicing the customer. In fact, every
issue of Restaurants USA or Nation's Restaurant News offers an
article designed to help restaurateurs more successfully service their
customers. While the restaurant market has carefully zeroed in on
the specific products and services customers require, no one has
carefully addressed the heart of the issue. The authors discuss the
"hospitality" in restaurant service.

Products and services are important to the customer, but in the
end the most important aspect of the dining experience is how well
or poorly the customer is treated by the people involved with the
restaurant. Service is the point of distinction in a fiercely competitive
market.
In 1972, there were 209,000 eating places in the country and
1002 potential customers per unit. By the end of the '80s the
number of units had grown to 330,000 and the number of potential
customers had fallen to 732. In other words, the restaurant industry
is growing faster than its customers.'
Patrons and operators do not always agree on whether or not the
guests are happy with how they are being treated. In the 1990
Tableservice Operator Survey, a survey of 456 tableservice
restaurant owners and operators, the National Restaurant
Association found that nine out of 10 restaurateurs believed that
their customers were either satisfied or very satisfied with the level
of service they were receiving.'
However, in an association Gallup survey it was found that only
six out of 10 adults were satisfied with the service they re~eived.~
Perhaps the reason the restaurateurs do not have an accurate view
of the customers' perceptions of service is because dissatisfied
customers often do not complain. They just do not come back.
"Hospitality" is a word that has become estranged from the
industry that borrowed it for its identity, and yet hospitality is the
key to a successful restaurant. Hospitable service in theory is the
key to success in the hospitality industry, but in reality it is a lost art
form. Perhaps hospitable service is a lost art form because people
today do not even understand what service is. In a 1990 study by
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Callan regarding the assessment of service quality, industry experts
defined service quality as "the application of a level of hospitality
which unobtrusively leads the guest to feel at home, well cared for
and anxious to return.'74
Many times diners go to a restaurant supposed to be one of the
most outstanding restaurants in the city and leave saying, "So
what?" Those feelings were probably not based on the atmosphere of
the restaurant, nor even on the food. They were more than likely a
reflection of the lack of hospitable service received from the people
caring for the diners' needs. People enjoy spending time in places
where service is the organization's top priority. Unfortunately these
places are in the minority. The industry today is interested in
providing the physical amenities and food that will increase
revenues, but managers lose sight of the fact that their most
important asset is their labor force. Until they sell their staff on the
importance of interjecting warmth and understanding into their
service, the customer will still leave saying "So what?"
Restaurants Lack Warmth, Understanding
This lack of warmth and understanding within service attitudes
is extremely detrimental when coupled with the new trends within
customer preferences. Faith Popcorn, founder of BrainReserve, aptly
described one new trend in customer preferences as cocooning, or
"the increasing tendency for people to stay home."5 Popcorn says,
"[People] aren't going out to restaurants as much. And when people
travel they want their room to be like their home - a small cocoon
so they will feel safe."
Today's diners are more selective in how many times they eat
out because of this cocooning behavior. Betsy Balsley, food editor of
the Los Angeles rimes for 17 years, was asked what she considered
the mistake restaurateurs make most often. She answered, "They
forget service. When I go out to eat, I want to be pampered and
babied."6 Diners want to be treated with warmth and understanding
while they are away from their homes. Those restaurateurs who
focus on maintaining a "cocooning" philosophy, and who instill this
attitude in all those who have contact with their customers in the
restaurant, will ensure that customers' needs are met.
The primary goal of a restaurateur is, therefore, not always just
the nuts and bolts of planning a menu or designing the kitchen. All
of these things are necessary, but the restaurateur must know how
to find, train, and keep employees who have the right attitude
toward service.
Although this idea seems obvious and simplistic in nature, most
decisions regarding managing a restaurant concern cost control or
the product itself, food. Managers often overlook the importance of
developing the attitude and philosophy toward service t h a t
employees must have. According to Costello, the right attitude
includes Courtesy, Attentiveness, Responsiveness, and Effort or
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Extra Effort (CARE).7Such service should be found in all employees,
from t h e host or maitre d' to t h e bus person. The physical
manifestation of this caring attitude will be a well-run facility, the
primary goal of which is to provide complete and competent service
to guests.
Employees learn this attitude in many ways. Modeling,
personality, and training are three methods which contribute to the
development of a hospitable staff. All these aspects interact with
each other to foster an attitude of service among employees.
Manager Is Role Model
Don Shapiro, president of First Concepts Development, a
training and consulting firm, points out the importance of the
manager as a role model. He says, "Treat your employees the way
~
who feel
you want them to t r e a t your g u e ~ t s . "Employees
appreciated by their superiors will convey that sense of appreciation
to the customers. As Shapiro points out, employees notice if a
manager smiles at guests or pitches in to help when the restaurant
is busy, and they will learn by watching.
David Romm from the Cornell School of Hotel Administration
discusses the role that an employee's personality plays: "People who
have good contact skills generally gravitate to high-contact jobs." He
cautions, however, about depending too much on finding employees
with a natural ability to be hospitable. With labor shortages and the
growing demand for "the crafting and delivery of specific kinds of
interaction,'' more on-the-job training may be required.
Gary Penn, president of the Professional Waiters School in Los
Angeles, states, "Ninety percent of the responsibility for awful
service falls directly on management. . . Waiters are hired on the
basis of a 20-minute interview and then are expected to learn the
ropes by 'shadowing' another waiter for a week. . ."loAlthough
traditional on-the-job-training is vitally important to the hospitality
industry, it cannot be expected to fulfill all the service training needs.
It is imperative to develop a training program that will teach service
attitudes to the people responsible for providing service to the guest.
Training Programs Are Fundamental
Therefore, actually training employees to exhibit more serviceoriented behavior is fundamental i n today's competitive
environment. Fortunately, it is also very possible, as many studies
and programs prove. For instance, Barbara Whitaker Shimko
reports on an employee training program called Project Transition,
"created to screen, train, and place welfare recipients in full-time
jobs in cooperating restaurants." Coaches helped these new
employees learn such skills as smiling a t customers, having a
professional appearance, establishing eye contact, and being able to
make small talk. Shimko reports that "not one of the 57 participants
in Project Transition went back on welfare during the first year.""
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Project Transition proves t h a t certain skills necessary to the
hospitality industry can be taught. More training of new employees
would only be beneficial to the restaurant industry. However, they
will be more hospitable; overall service will improve, and increased
employee satisfaction will decrease turnover.
A restaurant does not have to implement a "special" program
specifically and solely designed to improve service, however. An
ongoing empowerment program for employees can be equally
effective. By adopting a policy which gives employees the power to
make immediate decisions regarding service, a restaurant will be
able to improve its overall focus on hospitality.
Customers Are the Ultimate Beneficiaries
Once the restaurateur has established this attitude in his or her
employees, this philosophy of warm and hospitable service must be
conveyed to the customers. From the patron's first contact with the
restaurant, the experience should be one of friendly concern for the
needs of the diners. This concern should address all aspects of the
customer's visit to the r e s t a u r a n t . Diners calling to make
reservations should be warmly greeted, and every effort should be
made to seat the party promptly upon arrival. If a group must wait
for a table, the host should give a fair estimate of the waiting time.
Kathleen Talbert mentions the importance of giving special attention
to frequent customers. She says, "If a regular customer wants to
entertain a special guest, he'll go to the place where he'll be greeted
by name, fussed over, given his favorite table, and brought his usual
drink."12 If handled correctly, this initial contact with the restaurant
will communicate the caring attitude of all those involved with the
facility.
This level of service must continue even after customers are
seated. Starting with giving their order and ending with being
thanked as they leave the restaurant, customers must receive a
consistent quality of service. Restaurant consultant Karen MacNeil
discusses the importance of service at the end of the meal. After all,
says MacNeil, the last impression is the most important one. Small
services like checking back with the guests for that second cup of
coffee and offering desserts are often forgotten.13 MacNeil also
discusses the importance of properly busing the table, after the
diners have finished eating, a service that restaurateurs often
disregard. She says:

Because clearing takes place at the end of dinner, it has great
impact. If you serve someone a wonderful meal, only to later
disgust them with sloppy clearing, have you really enhanced
the restaurant's reputation?14
The language of service plays an important role in portraying
this hospitable service attitude. Gen LaGreca, president of

FIU Hospitality Review, Volume 10, Number 2, 1992
Contents © 1992 by FIU Hospitality Review. The reproduction of any
artwork, editorial or other material is expressly prohibited without written
permission from the publisher.

Hospitality Industry Training, states that "employees need to
understand the proper language of service."15 Simple statements
such as, "Hello," "Thank you," and "I'm sorry," coupled with smiles
and eye contact, are important in proper service language. When in
the restaurant, managers should try to pay attention to verbal and
nonverbal communication because these things exemplify the
organization's attitude regarding service. The fact that employees
can be trained to use the proper language of service allows for great
possibilities of service improvement in the industry.
Above and beyond servicing the average customer, restaurateurs
should always consider individuals with special needs. Doorways,
hallways, bathrooms, and some tables must be accessible. Hosts or
hostesses and maitre d's should be prepared to help elderly or
handicapped patrons get to their table with ease and comfort. Baby
chairs should be easily accessible and kept clean. Waiters and
waitresses should be knowledgeable enough about the menu to be
able to suggest meals that would be appropriate for heart patients,
dieters, vegetarians, or others watching their food intake. All these
individuals should receive the special attention necessary to enable
them to dine comfortably and pleasantly.
"Service is as important as facilities in hosting people with
disabilities," says blind industry consultant Harold Snider.'' A
restaurant staff, in being sensitive to special needs of a group or
guest, should be constantly alert for ways to offer help. Individuals
committed to providing hospitable service will continually reevaluate
their treatment of their customers to ensure that they are not
overlooking the needs of their special guests.
In an intensely competitive market, restaurateurs must change
their focus which has been on quality food, competitive prices,
interesting ambiance, promotion and publicity, on anything other
than the customers' needs. To remain competitive the focus must be
on the customer. Hospitable service has to be at the root of all that is
done. Focusing on making customers feel comfortable and happy to
have come to the establishment will improve the chance that they
will come back to eat at the restaurant again soon.
"If one aspect of the hospitality industry in the '90s is almost
universally agreed upon, it is that the demand for better service will
be greater than ever before," says Karen MacNeil. "Those operators
who succeed at all levels will see themselves as serving service."17
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Financial Failure in the 1990s:
the Case of Prime Motor Inns
by

Elisa S. Moncarz

Because of widespread overbuilding, operating cost increases, a
decline in economic activity, and other problems, a significant
number of hotels and restaurants have recently sought Chapter 1 1
protection under the Federal Bankruptcy Code. Many other firms
have experienced some degree of financial distress that could lead
to bankruptcy. The author presents statistics of hospitality firms in
financial distress, focusing on Prime Motor Inn's initial success and
the principal causes of its failure, which resulted in the filing of
protection from creditors in Federal Bankruptcy Court.

In 1990 business failures rose across the United States and in
every major industry sector, a clear indication of the economic
downturn that the country was experiencing. In fact, "most of the 25
largest bankruptcies in U.S. history were filed in the last three
years."' Financial failure for hotels and other lodging places
increased 58.1 percent in 1990, whereas failure in eating and
drinking places rose 10.9 p e r ~ e n t .Exhibit
~
1 shows the failure rate
per 10,000 listed concerns in both the lodging and eating out sectors.
Exhibit 1
Failure Rate Per 10,000 Listed Concerns

Hotels

ElEating Out

Source: Dun & Bradstreet, The Business Failure Record, 1991 and 1990 editions.
*I 990 preliminary data
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Exhibit 2
Causes of Business Failures in the Services lndustry - 1989
(Hotels and Other Lodging Places)

Source: Dun & Bradstreet, Business Failures Record, 1990.

Causes of Business Failures in the Services lndustry - 1990*
(Hotels and Other Lodging Places)

Finance
41%
Source: Dun & Bradstreet, Business Failures Record, 1991.
* 1990 preliminary data
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Table 1
Causes of Business Failures in Service Sector

1989

1990

Economic causes
Industry weakness
Insufficient profits
Inadequate sales

29.9%
10.3
1.8

34.3%
14.4
0.8

Finance causes
Burdensome institutional debt
Heavy operating expenses
Insufficient capital

15.9
11.8
12.3

15.0
10.2
15.5

Indeed, the hospitality industry entered the 1990s with a series
of challenges that threaten the survival of a significant number of
firms, both large and small. "A host of economic and demographic
problems have combined to challenge the phenomenal growth
pattern set by the industry in the last two decades resulting in
slower growth and fiercely competitive market place.773
Moreover, the
Persian Gulf crisis and the economic recession that the United
States experienced since the latter part of 1990 hit the hospitality
industry really hard, compounding the problem. Pleasure and
business travel declined, while confidence levels deterioriated.
There are many reasons leading to business failures in the
hospitality industry. Fewer than 10 percent of the failures are
directly attributable to acts of God, neglect, or dishonesty on the part
of management or owner.
According to Dun & Bradstreet's Business Failure R e ~ o r dthe
,~
reasons for business failures can be broken down into seven major
types: neglect causes, disaster, fraud, economic factor causes,
experience causes, finance causes, and strategy causes.
The Dun & Bradstreet Business Failure Record5for 1989, with
preliminary figures for 1990, revealed that the economic factor
causes contributed more than any other category to the failure of
lodging firms in the last two years (42.5 percent in 1989 and 50
percent in 1990). Exhibit 2 shows that finance causes were also
major contributors to business failures in the service sector (40
percent and 41 percent in 1989 and 1990, respectively), an indicator
of very tight market conditions.
Table 1 indicates principal economic and finance causes of
business failures in the service sector (hotels and other lodging
places) for 1989 and 1990.
According to Bjorn Hansen, a partner in Coopers & Lybrand, "60
percent of the hotels in the United States are experiencing a net
operating loss. The loss was expected to reach over $1000 per room
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in 1991."6 The recession and the fallout from the Persian Gulf war
aggravated the economic problems that the hospitality industry had
experienced as a result of the oversupply of rooms triggered by the
tax incentives provided to developers in the early and mid-1980s.
"Business travel came almost to a halt holding the average
occupancy rate to 60 percent for the first half of 1991."7
"Although the impact of overbuilding has tapered off in a
number of national markets, the lodging industry is still plagued by
many distressed proper tie^."^ This resulted in a significant number
of lodging properties not having sufficient cash flow to service the
mortgage debt and meet operating costs.
Prime Motor Inns Serves as Case Study
During the mid and late 1980s, a company named Prime Motor
Inns (Prime) was considered a success story in the hospitality
industry, "the darling of Wall Street." Prime's stock was soaring and
analysts from large brokerage firms were advising their clients to
buy. In September 1990 Prime filed for protection from creditors
under Chapter 11 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code and these same
analysts were shaking their heads in disbelief.
Prime was founded in 1968 by a group of real estate developers,
Melvin S. Taub, Samuel Brodie, Herbert Kay, and Peter E. Simon,
though its roots go back to the mid-1950s when it operated as a
single family home builder on the East Coast. Since going public in
1969, Prime's growth was both internal as a builder and operator of
motor inns and associated restaurants and cocktail lounges under
franchises from national chains (e.g., Ramada, Sheraton, Holiday
Inns, Howard Johnson, Hilton, and Days Inn) and external through
a series of major acquisitions.
The firm's early focus was on properties in the Northeast and
Florida. "Its early success had rested on its ability to build its motor
inns at lower cost than its competitors by doing its own site selection,
legal work, financing, design, general contracting, and building and
through aggressive marketing of its inns to corporations and the
business traveler^."^ It targeted the midpriced lodging market,
focusing on the corporate and business traveler, a more stable
revenue base than the pleasure traveler. Prime established early
relationships with nearby corporate travel and meeting planners.
Peter E. Simon, chairman of the board, reported to Prime's
shareholders on August 30, 1983: "During the last five years Prime's
net income and earnings per share have grown at a compounded
annual rate of 53 percent and 43 percent, respe~tively."'~
During the mid-1980s Prime's overall growth centered largely
around the acquisition of American Motor Inns in 1984 and Howard
Johnson Motor Lodges in 1985. The latter's acquisition transformed
Prime from a regional, multiple franchise operator to a national
company that was both franchisor and franchisee. Prime's stock
became a favorite investment "with an astonishing increase of some
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640 percent from July 1982 to January 1988."11 The Dow Jones
Industrial average increased about 142 percent during the same period.
During the 1980s, Prime's stock climbed from $1a share in 1980
to a peak of over $45 a share in 1987. The growth in market prices
was accompanied by strong increases in revenue, net income, and
earnings per share.
American Motor Inns Acquisition Was Turning Point
The year 1984 proved to be a major turning point in Prime's
history and a new era of company growth. "Prime paid $238 million
for American Motor Inns (AMI), which operated 50 motor inns,
primarily in Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina
and a resort in the Virgin Islands and held an 84 percent interest in
Universal Communications Systems, Inc., an independent telephone
interconnect ~ompany."'~
The acquisition "broadened Prime's assets
and operational base and doubled Prime's size."13
The next year was to be even more outstanding than 1984.
Prime was becoming one of the most profitable and rapidly-growing
firms in the hospitality industry "with an increase in revenues from
$95,952,000 in 1984 to $245,734,000 in 1985 (a fantastic increase of
156 percent in one year)."14 By July 1985, "Prime had sold 23 of the
AM1 properties to its former owner for $193 million, or 80 percent of
the total amount it paid for all the properties and still retained the
remaining motor inns."15 At the same time "Prime sold the
franchisor's Reef Beach Resort in St. Thomas for $100 million to
VMS Realty."'"
In November 1985 another major acquisition was made by
Prime, the Howard Johnsons franchise system. "Prime paid
approximately $235 million for the Howard Johnsons name, which
included 122 motor lodges and hotels and its 348 franchised motor
lodges."17 Within two years Prime sold 120 of the properties for $295
million, while retaining the franchises for which Prime earned
royalty fees. "Prime received more funds through sales of a number
of units than they had paid for the entire deal and their financial
position improved greatly."ls
Prime Revived Foundering Howard Johnsons
Prime invested $70 million to renovate the company-owned
properties while Howard Johnsons' franchisees spent an additional
$250 million by 1987. Besides refurbishing, two new products, Plaza
Hotels and Park Square Inns, were introduced, a new reservation
system was developed, and a major marketing effort was adopted by
Prime. "Development was stepped up from an average of 3.6
openings per year during the decade before 1985 to 20 per year for
the period 1986-1989."19 The reservation system was modernized so
operators could do everything a t the property level. National
advertising campaigns were launched, with promotions from "turned
upside down" to "this is Howard Johnsons" to "this is Howard
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Johnsons now." "Prime went after the business traveler using print,
television and radio campaigns which were very intr~sive."~'
All this
served to get franchisees excited about the Howard Johnsons brand.
Peter E. Simon, chairman of the board and chief executive officer
of Prime, commented in the company's 1988 annual report:
Fiscal 1988 was another setting year for Prime in net income,
earnings per share, and revenues, sustaining a pattern that
the company repeated for 13 consecutive years. Since 1970
Prime has achieved a compound annual rate of growth in net
income of 49 percent, in earnings per share of 42 percent and
in revenues of 26 per~ent.~'
He further explained Prime's focus on internal development:
"Prime is intensifying its internal development of new hotels and
additions to existing properties. Complementing our development
activities with others, we have in the planning stages or under
development more than 14 new hotels or room additions totalling
nearly 1500 rooms in proving or emerging markets."22
During the 1985-1988 period, Prime sold 2.3 million shares of
common stock for net proceeds of $89 million and sold $115 million of
convertible subordinated debentures. Prime also invested in 16
Holiday Inns properties financed by a publicly-traded Master
Limited partnership, which netted $80 million.
In 1988 Prime paid $82 million for 18 Wellesley Inns; its plans
were to develop about 10 new units per year. It sold nine of the
original 18 for $52 million and retained management contracts for
the properties.
As a result of these deals and Prime's obvious success, it received
ravishing reviews from several analysts and other interested parties:
"One of the savviest operators in the lodging industry."23 "Prime's
emergence as a force to be reckoned."" "Prime is expected to be the
biggest hotel company in the country by mid-1990."25
Prime Reported Fiscal 1989 As a Record Year
Simon began his letter to Prime's shareholders on August
1989 by stating: "Prime realized another record year in fiscal 1989
in terms of revenues, net income and net income per share."26 Net
income and net income per share had increased 15 percent on a
revenue increase of 11 percent. Moreover, "there were dramatic
increases in room rates that reflected Prime's aggressive growth
through acquisitions, franchising and internal development from
1984 through 1989 (total room count included franchised property
increases from 6054 in 1984 to 162,300 in 1989)."27
Prime's apparent success was attributed to "smart
management," low cost development and operations, tight control,
and an undercurrent of intelligence in development, operations and
franchising of lodging proper tie^."^^

FIU Hospitality Review, Volume 10, Number 2, 1992
Contents © 1992 by FIU Hospitality Review. The reproduction of any
artwork, editorial or other material is expressly prohibited without written
permission from the publisher.

In April 1989 Prime signed an agreement with New World
Development Co. Ltd. of Hong Kong in which Prime "would
participate in the acquisition of the hotel business of Ramada Inc.
domestic franchise system. The agreement was part of New World's
540 million deal to acquire Ramada's hotel business."29 The original
deadline for the deal to close was postponed when Ramada withdrew
plans to offer $400 million in high-yield securities that would have
financed the company's restructuring plans. A new proposal
announced in the fall of 1989 would change the amount of cash and
stock Ramada's shareholders would receive. In addition, Aztar,
Ramada's remaining casino business, would be required to raise
$170 million in debt secured by the company's assets. The purchase
of Ramada domestic franchise system vaulted Prime "into national
pr~minence."~~
In the summer of 1989 Prime unveiled aggressive expansion
plans that called for 50,000 additional rooms by 1994. The growth
was to be achieved primarily through new construction, though
conversions were to play a major role. Prime's plans called for about
150 all suites properties, whereas Howard Johnsons would build 50
hotels to be managed by the Continental Companies. The Wellesley
Inns were to be renamed Wellesley Inns by Howard Johnsons; 14
properties were under development and plans well made for a n
additional eight to 10 per year for the next several years.
Prime Entered Financial Deal With Servico
In 1989 a subsidiary of Prime "invested $64 million and made a
bridge loan of another $74 million to FCD Hospitality Inc, a private
company that was acquiring Servico (a hotel operating company)
Prime also entered into a
from the Southmark C~rporation."~'
consulting agreement with FCD Hospitality to help reposition
Servico over the next several years. "Prime and FCD Hospitality
intended to jointly develop the Royce Hotel chain (an upscale brand
of Servico) domestically and internati~nally.''~~
Investors began "to feel uneasy about Prime since the Ramada
and Servico transactions were completed amid declining values for
hotels."33As a result, Prime's stock prices experienced a steady decline
from the peak of over $45 in 1987.
in market value to the low $ 2 0 ~
Prime had achieved formidable increases in net income and net
income per share during most of the 1980s. Yet, an article published
in the Wall Street Journal in March 1989 focused attention on
Prime's quality of earnings:

Prime's recent gains have largely come from hotel sales
and from interest income. By contrast, analysts estimated
that Prime's per share income from its basic businesslodging, food and beverage and hotel franchises- had fallen a
penny a share, to 73 cents over the past two years.34

FIU Hospitality Review, Volume 10, Number 2, 1992
Contents © 1992 by FIU Hospitality Review. The reproduction of any
artwork, editorial or other material is expressly prohibited without written
permission from the publisher.

Thornton 07Glove, an analyst specializing in earnings quality,
noted: "Prime had been reporting a lower quality per share earnings,
which will continue to erode the price-earnings multiple."35
Along these lines, by examining Prime's income statement
included in the 1989 annual report,36interesting observations
concerning Prime's reported profitability and quality of earnings can
be drawn.
First, net gains on property transactions of $26.9 million, $25.2
million, and $18.4 million were included in Prime's revenues37
reported for the fiscal years 1989, 1988, and 1987, respectively. In
addition, interest and dividend income of $53.8 million, $38.1
million, and $33.9 million were reported for the same fiscal years.
These amounts represented 64.3 percent, 58.2 percent, and 62.5
percent of the income from continuing operations before income
taxes reported for those years. Accordingly, Prime's increases in net
income and earnings per share were heavily impacted by non-core
activities, as opposed to lodging and food and beverage sales.
Second, this interest and dividend income reflected a major
increase in mortgages and notes receivable from property sales and
construction and development projects in 1989, the full year impact
of a 1988 loan to a major Howard Johnsons franchisee, and the
interest derived from the Servico 12.25 percent subordinated notes
and the loan to FCD Hospitality Corporation, which financed the
stock purchase of Servico.
Moreover, the examination of Prime's statement of cash flow for
198Ys reveals that the cash flow received from operating activities
showed major deteriorations in 1988 and 1989, in spite of the
increases in net income of 29 percent and 15 percent reported in
those years. In fact, in 1989 only $1.8 million in cash was provided
by operating activities ( on net income of $77.4 million), whereas in
1988 a negative amount ($37.9 million in cash) was used for
operating activities (on net income of $67.5 million).
Cash flow from operations shows the cash impact of all
transactions that enter the determination of net income. As a result,
the net cash flow received from operating activities (cash inflows less
cash outflows)will normally differ from the amount of net income for
the period (reported on the income statement). The latter reflects the
revenue earned from selling goods or rendering services net of
expenses incurred in earning these revenues based on the accrual
basis of accounting.
Also, in 1989 $262.2 million of cash was used for investment
activities, resulting in a net decrease in cash and cash equivalents of
$73.3 million. Some of the major contributing factors to the
deterioration of Prime's cash flow were as follows:
an adjustment to net income of the net gains on property
transactions and notes receivable, arising from operating revenues
since these transactions did not contribute to cash flow
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the disbursement for mortgages and notes receivable of $179.9
million and $42.4 million in 1989 and 1988, respectively (these
amounts included the Servico loan and other property transactions)
major acquisitions of property and equipment to implement
the expansion and growth plan
major increases in long-term debt ($222.4 million and $195.5
million in 1989 and 1988) to help finance the acquisitions of property
and equipment and the Servico financing deal
1990 Began With Major Challenges For Prime

An article in the November 1989 issue of Lodging H o ~ p i t a l i t y ~ ~
outlined Prime's three-part strategy for capturing the lion's share of
the business:
rapid new development (minimum 50 hotels per year for the
next five years)
an aggressive marketing program targeted to the business
traveler
Prime to continue buying up successful small regional chains
like the limited service Wellesley Inns and AmeriSuites
With the purchase of the Ramada domestic franchise system a t
the end of 1989, "Prime was to benefit from Ramada's presence in
the Western U.S. where Howard Johnsons was only beginning to
build momentum."" In addition, the Ramada deal was estimated to
bring in about $50 million a year in professional fees."41
Yet, the aforementioned optimistic vision of Prime becoming
the industry leader took a different turn a t the beginning of the
new decade. In the January 22, 1990, issue of Forbes," Dana
Wechsler reported a recent cancellation of a new proposed issue of
300 million convertible debentures by Prime. More importantly,
the article focused on Prime's quality of earnings reported in the
1989 annual report to shareholders, its weak financial position,
a n d controversial deals completed in 1989. "While P r i m e
managed t o report pretax income of $125 million in fiscal 1989,
only $9 million came from core operations... the rest came from
interest, sale of properties, construction fees, and the like."" Hotel
financing had dried up and there were huge numbers of properties
on the verge of getting in trouble. Prime responded to this
problem by financing the transaction itself, which resulted in
increases in holdings of mortgages and notes receivable of 80
percent over the past two years to $593 million; some of the loans
were second mortgages.
"Making matters worse, Prime sometimes guarantees hotel
buyers and their bankers a certain level of fee income in the form
of either leases or a promised return. When profits decline, Prime
makes up the difference and only a portion of those contingent
liabilities were reported."44 A major emphasis was made in the
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Forbes article on the April 1989 financing transaction to help
purchase Servico. Servico had agreed to pay Prime $55 million in
consulting fees. Those fees and interest on the deal accounted for
about 30 percent of Prime's earnings in the first quarter of fiscal
1990 (i.e., quarter ending September 30, 1989), whereas no cash
had been paid to Prime.
The negative impact of this, coupled with the high leveraged
position and the weak performance of the lodging industry in early
1990, resulted in a further decline in Prime's prices, closing at $14
on January 31, 1990, a 68 percent drop from the mid-40s level it
was trading in August 1987.
Prime's earnings per share for the quarter ending March 31,
1990, declined by 98 percent to .O1 cent a share (from 55 cents a
share in the same period of the third quarter of fiscal 1989) on a
revenue decrease of 17 percent. David Simon noted on the third
quarter 1990 report to shareholders:
Revenues and earnings decreased because no development
income or property sales gains were generated in the
quarter as compared with $13.6 million in development
income and $546 million in property sales generated in the
third quarter of fiscal 1989.45
Although some analysts continued their buy recommendations
in early 1990, their belief was that Prime's share price decline,
and t h a t of the lodging group in general, was a function of
negative investor perceptions relating to institutional financing of
hotel development. Thus Prime's management had to prove that
financing was still achievable to meet its development objectives.
By May 1990, Prime's common shares were selling at a t low of $10
a share. This major price decline has been considered "what
analysts call Wall Street's loss of confidence in Prime's ability to
expand its business in the current market."46
Prime Announces Agreement to Sell Interests
In May 1990, pressured by soft hotel and real estate markets
and a hefty debt load, Prime announced an agreement to sell a 65
percent interest in its Howard Johnsons and Ramada franchised
systems to Blackstone Capital Partners L.P. for cash and notes
totalling about $200 million. The sale was expected to help
"reduce significantly Prime's bank debt and improve l i q ~ i d i t y . " ~ ~
F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e sale of Howard Johnsons a n d Ramada
"guaranteed Prime enough liquidity to hold onto the Servico hotels
if necessary and avoid selling them at fire sales prices."48
Indeed, "Prime was under pressure to reduce i t s bank
borrowings because both the size of its debt and a downturn in the
lodging and real estate industry had fueled investor speculation
that the company could face a cash squeeze."4g
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Simon believed "that the Blackstone deal would enable Prime to
maintain a significant stake in the future earnings potential of the
franchises and allow the company to focus on growth in specific
market niches: economy and limited service hotels..'"O
Standard & Poors contended that the Blackstone transaction
would help to significantly reduce Prime's debt and improve liquidity.
Yet, Standards & Poors decided to keep Prime's double B plus
subordinated debt on its Creditwatch because "Prime would be
parting with the bulk of a stable source of revenues from the
franchise system while increasing reliance on lesser known
busine~ses."~~
Margo L. Vignola, an analyst for Solomon Brothers,
stated in a May 12, 1990, New York Times article, "A combination of
events have really crushed Prime."52
Prime Files For Bankruptcy Protection
Shortly after the Blackstone transaction closed, Prime sought
protection from creditors under bankruptcy law proceedings. On
September 18, 1990, Prime and certain of its subsidiaries, saddled
with huge debt and heavy losses, "filed for protection from creditors
under Chapter 11 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code in the southern
district of Florida court."53Prime had indicated it might have to file
for bankruptcy court protection unless its banks agreed to approve
another $25 million loan and to restructure its debt of $550 million.
Since Prime was unable to work out a satisfactory arrangement, the
filing became necessary.
Prime's petition for reorganization coincided with a similar filing
in that court by Servico Inc., the principal asset of FCD Hospitality,
and "one of the straws that proved to break Prime's financial back."54
At the same time of the bankruptcy filing, Prime was stressing its
operations' consistency. Joseph Gaynor, Prime's vice-president of
corporate finance, indicated that "little change was being made
operationally and no major layoffs were anticipated ...Prime was
expected to emerge from bankruptcy in a period of time typical of
such actions, 12 to 18 months."55 He further noted that "Prime's
ability to emerge after Chapter 11 was contingent on financing
situations for hotel construction .... If that should happen Prime
would move forward with conservative financing as an operating and
managing company."56
Although Prime was expected to emerge from Chapter 11, "a
report issued by the bankruptcy courts indicated that more than one
quarter of Chapter 11 cases filed prior to 1987 were still pending in
1989, while only 10 to 12 percent of Chapter 11 cases result in a
successll reorganization of the debtor's business.'757Additionally, the
report asserted that approximately half of the Chapter 11 cases filed
prior to 1987 were closed in Chapter 11without confirmation of a plan
of reorganization or were closed as no asset Chapter 7 cases. "From
the Chapter 11 cases whose plans were eventually confirmed, an
average of 740 days elapsed from date of filing until c~nfirmation."~~

FIU Hospitality Review, Volume 10, Number 2, 1992
Contents © 1992 by FIU Hospitality Review. The reproduction of any
artwork, editorial or other material is expressly prohibited without written
permission from the publisher.

In the summer of 1991, Prime announced that it wanted to
merge with Servico, which was also operating under bankruptcy
law protection. "The merger could settle substantially all the
claims between Servico a n d Prime.7759P r i m e loaned FCD
Hospitality, the parent of Servico, $74 million in cash and took
over $64 million in FCD Hospitality debt in 1989. The proposed
plan, subject to approval of the bankruptcy court, would allow
P r i m e a n d Servico t o combine some a s s e t s to form a new
corporation. "The new firm would provide cash and newly issued
securities t h a t Servico would distribute to creditors under its
reorganization. The new firm would assume Servico's debt."'jO
Many Factors Accounted for Prime's Bankruptcy
There were, indeed, many reasons that led to Prime's collapse
in September 1990. Among them are the following:
Prime acquired a n astronomical amount of debt in 1989
caused by two major transactions: the acquisition of Ramada7s
chain domestic franchise system, and the investment and bridge
loan to FCD Hospitality Company to help finance the Servico
acquisition.
Prime's plan to repay debts with the proceeds of the FCD
Hospitality loan and with public offerings of securities did not
materialize. On the contrary, Prime had to extend the FCD loan
repayments in order to avoid bankruptcy. In retrospect, Prime
should have seriously considered t h e merits a n d demerits of
developing the joint venture to purchase Servico in light of the
significant amount of financial difficulties experienced by Servico's
parent company.
Prime relied too heavily on non-operating income sources. It's
quality of earnings had been questioned by several analysts for some
time. A major portion of its increasing earnings was generated from
property sales, interest income, and other non-operating sources.
Moreover, "Prime was using deceptive practices by reporting
property sales as operating earning^."^'
In spite of reporting record increases in earnings and earnings
per share, Prime experienced a decrease in cash flows, especially
from operating activities. Prime reported a decreasing trend in cash
flow generated from operating activities i n 1988 a n d 1989.
Nonetheless, investors ignored this negative trend since stock
market prices were relatively high in those years.
Several liquidity and solvency measures declined.
Hotel and real estate markets were depressed.
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Financing sources of hotels dried up, partly because of
problems in the high-yield, high-risk junk bond market and an
oversupply of rooms. Prime became very vulnerable because a major
portion of its earnings came from acquiring and selling hotel
properties and retaining management contracts.
Finally, in 1990 investors lost confidence in Prime's long-term
prospects and its ability to withstand difficult economic times. This
resulted in stock prices dropping "from $38 in 1989 to $23 in 1990
and down to 50 cents at the time of filing for bankrupt~y."~~
Table 2 sets forth major events affecting Prime Motor Inns' stock
performance between 1982 and 1990.
Table 2
Prime Motor Inns, Inc.
Major Events and Corresponding Market Prices
1982-1990
Date

Major Event

Market Price
Per Share*

Aug. 1982

Rush to buy consumer stocks began

June 1983 Prime reported a 39 percent increase in
earnings and a rise of 24 percent in earnings
per share in 1983.

$6 318

9 114

Oct. 1984

Prime acquired American Motor Inns
for $238 million.

11318

Nov. 1985

Prime acquired Howard Johnsons
for $235 million.

26 518

Aug. 1986

Prime began the successful sale of the
collection of properties acquired
under the Howard Johnsons brand.

34 112

Aug. 1987

Prime had successfully disposed of the
majority of the acquired Howard
Johnson's assets for approx. $250 million.
Moreover, Prime reported a 39 percent
increase in earnings in fiscal 1987.

Nov. 1987

Prime took an especially hard hit
during the October 1987 stock crash.
Its decline was the largest among lodging firms.

March 1988 Prime posted a very strong recovery
from the crash lows of 1987. It reported
a 40 percent owth in earnings per
share in the irst half of fiscal 1988.

p
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25

39

--

-

Table 2
(continued)
Market Price
Per Share*

Date

Major Event

Aug. 1988

Prime aid $82 million for 18 hotels, land
and re ated assets with the intention of
converting them to Wellesley Inns
by Howard Johnsons.

f

April 1989 Prime signed an agreement
with New World Development Co. Ltd.
of Hong Kong to articipate in
the acquisition o Ramada domestic
franchise system.

!

May 1989

Prime invested $64 million and made a
bridge loan of $74 million to FCD
Hospitality Co. to help finance the
Servico acquisition.

Aug. 1989

Prime unveiled aggressive ex ansion
lans that called for 50,000 a ditional
otel rooms in five years.

!i

R
Jan. 1990

A 1/22/90Forbes article focused on
Prime's deceptive accountin reporting
of property transactions an questioned
controversial deals completed in 1989.

f

April 1990 Prime reported a 98 percent decline
in earnings per share for the quarter
ending March 31, 1990. Also, Wall
Street lost confidence in Prime's ability
to expand its business in a declining
economic environment.
May 1990

Prime signed agreement to sell 65 percent
stake of Howard Johnsons and Ramada
to Blackstone Capital Partners for
approximately $200 million

July 1990

Prime extended FCD loan re ayment
dates raising doubts of its co ectibility.

Sept. 7'90

Prime attempted to restructure debt
while preparing to file for bankruptcy

/?

Sept. 18'90 Prime filed for bankruptcy
-

-

- -

* On the last day of the month, unless otherwise noted; adjusted to reflect stock splits of

4:3 declared in January 1986 and January 1985 and a 3:2 stock split in May 1983.

FIU Hospitality Review, Volume 10, Number 2, 1992
Contents © 1992 by FIU Hospitality Review. The reproduction of any
artwork, editorial or other material is expressly prohibited without written
permission from the publisher.

References
'Ronald G. Quintero, "The CPA Role as a Bankruptcy Examiner," The CPA
Journal, (September 19911, p. 42.
ZBusinessFailure Record, The Dun & Bradstreet Corporation, (19911, pp. 8-9.
3Walter Van Benthuysen, "What is ahead for food service in the 1990s,"
Nation's Restaurant News, (October 6, 19891, p. F-8.
4Dun & Bradstreet defines business failures as those businesses involved in
court proceedings or voluntary actions involving losses to creditors. It does not
include business discontinuances.
5Dun& Bradstreet, op. cit, pp. 18-19.
"dwin McDowell, "Hotels await the wake up call," The New York Times,
(September 24, 19911, C-1.
71bid.
BMichaelCahill, "The many personalities of whimpering properties," Lodging,
(January 1990), p.48.
9Rick Burnham, "Prime Motor's Low Profile Founders let Uncanny Growth
Record Speak for Itself," Investor's Daily, (June 12, 19871, p. 12.
loprime Motor Inns, Inc., "Letter to Shareholders," 1983 Annual Report,
(August 30,19831, p.2.
"Norman Ringstrom and Elisa S. Moncarz, "An Analysis of Stock Market
Performance: The Dow Jones Industrial Average and the Top Performing Lodging
Firms, 1982-1988,"FIU Hospitality Reuieut, (Fall 19881, pp. 28-54.
"Burham, op. cit., p. 21.
'"instrom and Moncarz, op. cit.
"Ibid, p. 7 .
'"urham, op. cit.
' T a r l o Wolff, "Prime in expansive mode," Hotel & Motel Management,
(November 6,1989), p. A-149.
I7Prime motor Inns, Inc. "Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements," 1986
Annual Report, p. 21.
lRRingstromand Moncarz, op. cit., p. 9.
'$Megan Rowe, "Prime Motor Inns: Lean, Mean and Hungry," Lodging
Hospitality, (November 19891, p. 29.
'OIbid., p. 24.
"Prime Motor Inns, Inc., "To our stockholders," 1988 Annual Report,
(September 12, 19881, pp.2-5.
"Ibid.
'Value Line Investment Surveys, (June 12, 1987),p. 1788.
'"we,
op. cit, p. 26
"Wolff, op. cit.
'"rime Motor Inns, Inc., "Letter to shareholders," 1989 Annual Report,
(September 5, 1989), p. 2.
"I6 id.
"Rowe, op. cit, p. 29.
291bid,p. 32.
"Dennise M. Brennan, "In its Prime," Restaurant Business, (June 10, 1990),
pp. 108-114.
"Bill Gillete, "Prime loan to hasten Servico deal," Hotel & Motel Management,
(May 8, 1989),p. 1.
"16id. p. 4.
"Value Line Investment Surveys, (March 9,1990), p. 1784.
""Roger Lowenstein, "Prime Motor Inns' Stock Slump May be tied to Bearish
View of Firms' Earnings Quality," The Wall Street Journal, (March 21,1989), C-5.
35Zbid.
"Prime Motor Inns, Inc., Consolidated Statement of Income," 1989 Annual
Report, p. 17.

FIU Hospitality Review, Volume 10, Number 2, 1992
Contents © 1992 by FIU Hospitality Review. The reproduction of any
artwork, editorial or other material is expressly prohibited without written
permission from the publisher.

37PrimeMotor Inns, Inc., "Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements, 1989
Annual Report, p. 25.
38PrimeMotor Inns, Inc., Consolidated Statement of Cash Flow, 1989 Annual
Report, p. 20.
39Rowe,op. cit.
"Zbid., p. 32.
"Wolff, op. cit., A-149.
42DanaWechsler, "Lend now, worry later," Forbes, (January 22, 1990), pp. 99100.
"Ibid.
"Zbid.
"Prime Motor Inns, Inc., Third Quarter Report, (Three months ending March
31, 1990),p.2.
"Robin Goldwyne Blumenthal, "Prime Motor Inns Agrees to Sell 65 % Of Two
Chains to Blackstone Affiliate," The Wall Street Journal, (May 14, 1990),p. A-3.
"Zbid.
48MichaelLev, "Blackstone in Lodging Chain Deal," The New York Times, (May
12,1990), p. Y-19.
49Zbid.
mBlumenthal,op. cit.
"Ibid.
52Lev,op cit., p. Y-19.
"George Taninecz, "Prime Bankruptcy Spreads Uncertainty," Hotel and Motel
Management, (October 22, 19901, p.1.
541bid.
551bid.
"Ibid., p.96.
57Quintero,op. cit., p. 42.
"Ibid.
""Prime, Servico seek merger," Lodging Hospitality, (June 1991), p. 26.
solbid.
elEdward Tavlin, guest lecture, Florida International University School of
Hospitality Management, (November 14,1990).
==Taninecz,
op. cit., p. 97.
- -

Elisa S. Moncarz i s a professor i n t h e School of Hospitality
Management at Florida International University.

FIU Hospitality Review, Volume 10, Number 2, 1992
Contents © 1992 by FIU Hospitality Review. The reproduction of any
artwork, editorial or other material is expressly prohibited without written
permission from the publisher.

